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Mediation Through Recontextualization:
The European Union and The Dialogue
Between Kosovo and Serbia
Krenar GASHI*, Vjosa MUSLIU** & Jan ORBIE***
The EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina has been hailed as a major achieve-
ment for the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy as well as for the ‘European future’ of
Kosovo and Serbia, since it started in 2011. Looking at EU discourse – speeches, statements
and press releases – this article problematizes the logic of the dialogue, its aims in the process and
its outcomes. Using the framework of ‘recontextualization’, developed by Van Leeuwen and
Wodak, we explore how the EU is substituting elements of the dialogue and adding elements
that are not intrinsic to the process, which then create ambiguities which we problematize. We
argue that ambiguities are not limited merely to the outputs of the dialogue, such as agreements,
but they also obscure the very meaning of the dialogue for the EU, for Kosovo and Serbia, as
well as for EU’s relations with both countries.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Belgrade-Pristina dialogue facilitated by the European Union (EU) has been
hailed as a major achievement for the EU’s foreign policy as well as for the
‘European future’ of Kosovo and Serbia. Former High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton, as
well as her successor Federica Mogherini, have personally lead the EU’s ‘facilita-
tion’ of this dialogue, at which the political representatives of the Kosovo and
Serbia met for the first time. The process of the dialogue, which is usually referred
to as the dialogue on ‘normalization of relations’ between Kosovo and Serbia, has
been high on the EU‘s foreign policy agenda since it started in 2011.1 The ‘First
Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations’ reached
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1 Hereafter referred to as ‘the dialogue’.
between the two countries in 20132 has been widely acclaimed as a success story
for EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).3 On the day the
Agreement was signed, on 19 April 2013, former European Commission
President José Manuel Barroso said: ‘This is an historic day for Serbia-Kosovo
relations, for the entire Western Balkans region and for the European Union’.4
According to the EU, which serves as a facilitator between Kosovo and Serbia,
the dialogue aims ‘to promote cooperation between the two sides, help them
achieve progress on the path to Europe and improve the lives of the people’.5 The
process of the dialogue is embedded in the context of European integration, as
both Kosovo and Serbia have put accession to the EU as their prime foreign policy
goal. This setting puts the EU in a strong position to mediate the dialogue, mainly
due to the leverage it has vis-à-vis the parties.6 Indeed, Serbia’s accession negotia-
tions as well as Kosovo’s Stabilization Association Agreement (SAA) were directly
conditioned with the parties’ commitment to dialogue and were achieved only
after the Brussels Agreement was finalized in 2013. Yet, as Wolfgang Koeth rightly
assessed in this journal, the EU has an ‘awkward’ relationship with Kosovo, mainly
owing to the fact that five EU Member States – Cyprus, Greece, Romania,
Slovakia and Spain – do not recognize Kosovo’s independence from Serbia.7
The Union maintains a neutral status towards Kosovo’s statehood,8 while the
lack of unity among Member States is generally thought to hinder the EU’s role
in Kosovo and in the region.9
In spite of being a ‘moving target’ there are already some early academic
accounts that have attempted to make sense of what the EU is doing in its efforts to
pacify and ‘normalize’ relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The common
2 First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations (Brussels 2013), http://www.
kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/FIRST_AGREEMENT_OF_PRINCIPLES_GOVERNING_
THE_NORMALIZATION_OF_RELATIONS,_APRIL_19,_2013_BRUSSELS_en.pdf.
3 Hereafter referred to as the Brussels Agreement.
4 J. Barroso, Statement on the EU-Facilitated Dialogue Between Serbia and Kosovo, 19 April 2013 (Brussels
2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-577_en.htm.
5 CFSP, EU Facilitated Dialogue for the Normalisation of Relations Between Belgrade and Pristina (2015),
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/dialogue-pristina-belgrade/index_en.htm.
6 F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier, Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 11(4) J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 661–679 (2004); M. Vachudova, Europe
Undivided: Democracy, Leverage & Integration After Communism (Oxford University Press 2005); O.
Anastasakis, The EU’s Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Towards a More Pragmatic
Approach, 8 Southeast Eur. & Black Sea Stud. (2008).
7 W. Koeth, The Serbia-Kosovo Agreement on Kosovo’s Regional Representation and the ‘Feasibility Study’: A
Breakthrough in EU – Kosovo Relations?, 18(1) Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 127–144 (2013).
8 W. Koeth, State Building Without a State: The EU’s Dilemma in Defining Its Relations with Kosovo, 15
Eur. For. Aff. Rev. 227–247 (2010).
9 L. Greiçevci, EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo, 12(3) Persps.
Eur. Pol. & Soc. 283–303 (2011); D. Papadimitriou & P. Petrov, Whose Rule, Whose Law? Contested
Statehood, External Leverage and the European Union’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, 50(5) J. Com. Mkt.
Stud. 746–763 (2012).
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denominator of these accounts is that the dialogue has been marred by ambiguities,
be that in the substance of what has been achieved or the process as a whole. For
the EU to deliver Kosovo and Serbia’s agreement on a single document, it meant
that a lot of ‘constructive ambiguity’ had to be put in its language.10 Additionally,
these ambiguities have served to strengthen the position of the EU vis-à-vis the
parties. Julian Bergmann and Arne Niemann argue that the EU’s success as a
mediator of the talks was not only based on its leverage towards the parties, but
also on a strategy of ‘manipulation of formulation’ that draws from this leverage.
Ambiguities, however, have their side effects. As Florian Bieber clearly shows,
whilst ambiguities have yielded some results, they also contain risks since they leave
room for divergent and conflicting interpretation by the parties.11 This has put to
into question both the sustainability and the irreversibility of the process.
In this article, using a critical discourse analysis approach, we attempt to take
the literature one step further by elaborating more on what ambiguities are present
in EU’s discourse and by explicitly problematizing how these ambiguities are
performed with regard to the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. Notwithstanding that
both academic and policy literature are unequivocal on the ambiguity of the
dialogue, few of them investigate in detail how this ambiguity is performed in
the EU’s discursive practices. Unlike the literature consulted above, we intervene
more directly in the tropes and meanings that the EU attaches to the dialogue to
therefore problematize on its aims, goals, and outcomes. Our corpus of data
includes over one hundred texts – statements, speeches, press releases – represent-
ing virtually all the EU’s communication on the dialogue in the course of three
years between April 2013 and April 2016.
The EU’s discourse is analysed through the recontextualization concept, as
developed by Theo Van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak, who argue that each
representation always involves recontextualization, as actors do not represent
participants, processes and settings by giving a clear account of events, but rather
through a process that contains deletions, substitutions and additions.12 Through
recontextualization, meanings are changed to the point where ‘something stands
for something else’.13 We identify and problematize elements that the EU has
recontextualized in the dialogue, by altering their meanings. The article begins
10 A. Ernst, The April Agreement – A Step Towards Normalization Between Belgrade and Pristina?, 1(1)
Contemp. Southeastern Eur. 122–126 (2014).
11 F. Bieber, The Serbia-Kosovo Agreements: An Success Story ?, 40(3/4) Rev. Central & East Eur. L. 285–
319 (2015).
12 T. Van Leeuwen & R. Wodak, Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse-Historical Analysis, 1
Discourse Stud. 87–118 (1999).
13 T. Van Leeuwen, Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis (Oxford University
Press 2008).
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with an overview of the dialogue process, followed by a contextualization of the
current setup of the dialogue and then analyse it through recontextualization.
2 THE ROAD TO DIALOGUE
Relations between Kosovo and Serbia are historically charged and complex. In
socialist Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Serbia were both units of the federation, but
they were not equal. Whilst Serbia was one of the six ‘republics’ within the
Yugoslav federation, Kosovo enjoyed the status of an autonomous province,
which was arguably similar but not equal to other republics. Following the rise
to power of nationalists led by Slobodan Milošević, Kosovo’s autonomy was
revoked in 1990 and its territory was put under direct control of Belgrade.
Throughout the Yugoslav conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, Kosovo Albanians
who constituted over 90% of the Kosovo population and were deprived of
basic rights, organized peaceful resistance to Milošević’s regime. The situation
escalated in the late 1990s when Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) initiated a
series of guerrilla attacks on Serbian forces. The violence escalated in to wide
conflict in 1998–1999, during which time thousands lost their lives and nearly
one million Kosovo Albanians were expelled from the country. Violence ended
only after a long and intensive NATO air campaign, after which Milošević’s
forces withdrew from Kosovo, opening the way for an United Nations (UN)
administration to be installed.14 During the time of the UN Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Kosovo built its state-like
institutions.15
Between late 2005 and 2007, the UN initiated and mediated a series of
negotiations between representatives of Kosovo institutions and Serbia’s govern-
ment, aiming to find a permanent solution for Kosovo’s political status. By early
2007, the negotiations were failing; Kosovo demanded independence whereas
Serbia demanded a special autonomy within its jurisdiction. The UN Secretary
General tasked the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, who served as the
mediator for the talks between Kosovo and Serbia, to draft a proposal regarding
Kosovo’s final status. In a detailed plan, Ahtisaari laid out a comprehensive proposal
recommending to the UN that the final status of Kosovo should be independence,
supervised by the international community.16 Serbia rejected the plan as did its
14 UN Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf.
15 A Yannis, The UN as Government in Kosovo, 10 Global Governance 67–81 (2004); See also UNMIK,
Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (2001), http://www.assembly-kosova.
org/common/docs/FrameworkPocket_ENG_Dec2002.pdf.
16 M. Ahtisaari, Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (New York 2007).
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traditional ally, Russia. As a result, the Ahtisaari Plan was never put to a vote in the
UN Security Council.17
The EU was actively involved in Kosovo throughout this time. It was in
charge of the so-called ‘pillar four’ of UNMIK, economic development. The EU
also supported the Ahtisaari process.18 By the time it became obvious that the plan
would not be approved by the UN Security Council, the EU found itself internally
divided. Most of the large Member States were keen to recognize a unilateral
declaration of independence by Kosovo but some were fiercely opposing the idea.
In spite of failing to reach a unified position on Kosovo’s independence, the EU
managed to find a way to remain involved, and established its rule of law mission
in Kosovo – EULEX – on the eve of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.19
Backed by the United States and most of the EU Member States, Kosovo declared
independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008. Within days, Britain, France,
Germany and Italy announced they recognized the new state. Serbia continued to
oppose Kosovo’s statehood by asking the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
through the General Assembly of the UN, for an advisory opinion on the legality
of Kosovo’s independence. After February 2008 Serbia continued to maintain
control over northern Kosovo, which is populated by Serbs, organizing elections
and maintaining local administration and security services.20 In July 2010, the ICJ
stated that ‘Declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate
general international law’.21 This opinion, however, did not change much regard-
ing Kosovo’s relations with Serbia, nor to the EU’s relations with Kosovo. Indeed,
the ‘abnormality’ of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia reached its peak,
with one part of the Serbian government, especially its President, seeking fresh
talks with Kosovo, and another, especially the foreign ministry, lobbying hard to
prevent consolidation of Kosovo’s statehood abroad.22
After a failed attempt to contest Kosovo’s statehood at the UN General
Assembly, Serbia joined the then twenty-seven EU Member States in sponsoring
a resolution that opened the way for the EU-mediated talks with Kosovo. The
Resolution, which was approved with a consensus by the General Assembly,
‘welcomes the readiness of the European Union to facilitate a process of dialogue
between the parties; the process of dialogue in itself would be a factor for peace,
17 H. Perrit Jr., The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan (Cambridge
University Press 2010).
18 J. Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (Tauris 2009).
19 S. Economides & J. Ker-Lindsay, Forging EU Foreign Policy Unity from Diversity: The ‘Unique Case’ of the
Kosovo Status Talks, 15(4) Eur. For. Aff. Rev. 495–510 (2010).
20 K. Gashi, Kosovo, in Nations in Transit 2013 (Freedom House 2013).
21 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, I.C.
J. Rep 403 (2010).
22 Bieber, supra n. 11.
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security and stability in the region, and that dialogue would be to promote
cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the European Union and improve
the lives of the people’.23
In 2011, the first meeting between Kosovo and Serbia were held at the so-
called ‘technical level’ where, within two years, agreements were reached on issues
of freedom of movement, civil registry books, cadastral records, customs stamps,
mutual acceptance of education diplomas, integrated border management, regional
representation, telecommunications and energy. Based on neo-functionalist logics,
Visoka and Joyce rightly argue that most of these ‘technical’ issues had political
connotations, thus, gradually, the dialogue ‘spilled-over’ to a political level.24
3 THE BRUSSELS AGREEMENT: MAKING SENSE OF AMBIGUITIES
On 19 April 2013, both prime ministers initialled the Brussels Agreement, which
consists of fifteen highly ambiguous points that vaguely read that Serbia agrees to
‘normalize relations’ with Kosovo authorities and to withdraw all of its presence
from the Serb-dominated northern Kosovo where ethnic tensions had remained
high. Three municipalities in northern Kosovo – still not under full control by
Kosovo’s authorities – would integrate into the Kosovo system, and, in exchange,
Kosovo agreed to extend the level of self-government for Kosovo Serbs, including
the establishment of an Association/Community of the Serb Municipalities. The
two countries agreed not to block each other in the process of European integra-
tion. The ‘Brussels Agreement’ is seen by all parties involved as the main outcome
and culmination of this negotiation process in Brussels.
This ‘Brussels Agreement’ displays two paradigmatic forms of ‘ambiguity’
which require explanation before moving on to the recontextualization question.
The first one pertains to the legal status of the agreement. The ‘Brussels
Agreement’ was not signed by the three parties. In Kosovo it has been ratified as
an ‘international agreement’ by the National Parliament,25 no signature and/or
ratification, however, has taken place at the EU level or in Serbia. The legal
ambiguity of the agreement provides flexibility for parties in implementing its
provisions. In addition, the ambiguity of its legal status enables all three parties to
continuously produce and reproduce the ‘Agreement’ in different, and at times,
23 UNGA, Resolution 64/298 (UN 2010), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/64/298.
24 G. Visoka & J. Doyle, Neo-Functional Peace: The European Union Way of Resolving Conflicts, 54(4) J.
Com. Mkt. Stud. 1–16 (2015).
25 Kosovo Assembly, Law No.04/L-199 on Ratification of the First International Agreement of Principles
Governing the Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia
(2013), http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/Law%20on%20ratification%20of%
20agreement%20-normalization%20of%20relations%20between%20Kosovo%20and%20Serbia.pdf.
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contradictory ways. For instance, the ratification of the Agreement by the National
Parliament in Kosovo enables the local elite to justify the process to their local
constituents, while at the EU level it sends the message of Kosovo’s full commit-
ment to the process of ‘normalization of relations’ with Serbia.
The second ‘ambiguity’ speaks to the content of the agreement. Most of the
fifteen provisions of the Brussels Agreement are vague and unclear in terms of
wording and implementation. For instance, the Association/Community of Serb
Municipalities is referred to with both words – ‘Association’ and ‘Community’ – the
former used in Kosovo in order to discursively minimize the powers of such an
institution, and the latter used in Serbia to do exactly the opposite. In EU discourse,
the Brussels Agreement is portrayed as having a significant importance in both
countries as well as in the EU. Local observers in Kosovo and Serbia have proble-
matized that dialogue was carried on in a non-transparent fashion and that imple-
mentation has largely been lacking.26 Given these ambiguities, both countries have
continuously tried to communicate the Agreement as their own victory when
communicating the dialogue to their respective publics.27 Such interpretations
have often resulted with parties creating a confusion and the need to sit down
again in Brussels and agree once again on what they initially agreed. To date policy
analysts have called the dialogue and the Brussels Agreement ‘unfinished’ business,28
while early academic accounts have warned on the sustainability and irreversibility of
the process.29
4 RECONTEXTUALIZING THE ‘HISTORIC’ DIALOGUE
This section provides a more in-depth and theoretically informed problemati-
zation of this discourse by drawing on the work of Van Leeuwen and Wodak.
Embedded within critical discourse analysis, these authors have put forward the
concept of recontextualization. Recontextualization is reproduced through
deletions, substitutions and additions. Having analysed the corpus of our data,
we have established that in the case of the EU-facilitated dialogue between
Belgrade and Pristina every deletion has involved some kind of substitution.
Thus, what follows is our exploration and problematization of substitutions and
additions.
26 V. Hopkins, Big Deal: Civilised Monotony? (BIRN 2014); V. Hopkins, Big Deal: Lost in Stagnation
(BIRN 2015).
27 V. Todoric & L. Malazogu, Belgrade – Prishtina Dialogue: Transformation of Self-Interest Required
(Prishtina 2011); K. Bassuener & B. Weber, Not Yet a Done Deal: Kosovo and the Prishtina-Belgrade
Agreement (The New Century 2013); Hopkins, supra n. 26.
28 Bassuener & Weber, supra n. 27.
29 Bieber, supra n. 11.
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4.1 SUBSTITUTIONS
According to Van Leeuwen, substitution is the most fundamental transformation of
a practice that can happen through discourse.30 During representation, elements of
practice are substituted by signs, where meanings are altered to the extent that
‘something stands for something else’.31 The complex natures regarding actors,
actions and practice are substituted by generalizations or abstractions, or the other
way around. When such a substitution happens, ‘new meanings are added, though
in some cases more drastically than in others’.32 Our analysis below shows that
substitution is used ‘by default’ by the EU when communicating on the Belgrade-
Pristina dialogue.
The first substitution is vivid in the very name of the dialogue and is rather a
drastic one. Instead of calling it a dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, the EU has
chosen to reduce the name into a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. This
substitution to call a political process between two countries with the names of
their respective capitals retains the EU position as neutral to the status of Kosovo.33
This neutrality is further constructed by arranging the names of the capitals in an
alphabetical order, in order to avoid any kind of perception of bias. What is
discursively substituted is the ‘statehood’ of both parties, albeit a contested state-
hood in the case of Kosovo. In the discourse of the EU, Kosovo and Serbia are
only ‘parties’ whose function is reduced to ‘normalization of relations’ with each
other.
What is evident in this form of substitution is the backgrounding and even the
reduction of statehood for both parties, where both Kosovo and Serbia do not
appear as state agents. Their sovereignty, be it contested or fully-fledged, is muted.
However, what is foregrounded in this case is their aspirations to join the EU – by
being part of this dialogue – notwithstanding that in both cases aspirations to join
the EU are very different and fragmented. Unlike Serbia, one of the reasons
Kosovo seeks EU integration is to obtain confirmation of its statehood. Unlike
Kosovo which has an overwhelming political and societal support for EU mem-
bership, public opinion in Serbia shows a much lesser positive sentiment for the
EU34 and its political elite is fragmented with regard to Serbia’s EU path. What is
produced here is, on the one hand, the alleged equality of Belgrade and Pristina as
capitals and parties, and on the other hand, the production of Belgrade and Pristina
as cohesive and linear in their quest for EU membership. This discursive
30 Van Leeuwen, supra n. 13.
31 Van Leeuwen & Wodak, supra n. 12.
32 Van Leeuwen, supra n. 13.
33 See Bieber, supra n. 11.
34 European Western Balkans, 48% of Serbian Citizens in Favour of Joining the EU (2016), https://
europeanwesternbalkans.com/2016/02/01/48-of-serbian-citizens-in-favor-of-joining-the-eu/
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performance is problematic primarily because it simulates the premise that it is not
the agency of a state, or the lack of it that is important in settling disputes, even
when these disputes are essentially inter-state like disputes.
The second substitution is no less problematic as it relates to the ‘awkward-
ness’ of the EU vis-à-vis ‘the parties’: the division between the Member States on
Kosovo’s statehood is substituted with a superficial and marginalized unity. In this
substitution, the strategy of representing actors is oriented towards the Member
States, whose role is passivized, through which, a kind of European unity regarding
the dialogue is further simulated. Although it is not to be expected that the EU
institutions would continuously mention it, references to a kind of Member State
‘unity’ regarding the dialogue show tendencies of simulation:
‘Since October 2012 the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/
Vice-President of the Commission Catherine Ashton is personally facilitating the high-
level dialogue and is backed in her work by all Member States’.35
‘All our Member States are united in commending you for your work and expressing their
appreciation through this decision. Kosovo has worked hard to meet the EU’s expecta-
tions. You delivered, and so did the EU’.36
‘At the foreign ministers meeting this week, the EU Member States recognised yet again
efforts made by the leadership of Serbia and Kosovo in normalisation of their relations’.37
It is not clear though whether this simulation is to merely reflect a unity among the EU
Member States, or whether being involved in a country which’s independence does not
recognize ‘en block’, the EU seeks to reclaim its credibility in the region.38
The third substitution concerns the fact that problems with implementation of the
agreements are usually absent from the EU’s discourse. In some cases, however,
they are substituted with references to additional negotiations on implementation,
as the following statements of the HR/VP show:
‘I welcome the decision of both sides to adopt the implementation plan which translates
into practice the provisions of the April Agreement. I would like once again to commend
Prime Minister Dačić and Prime Minister Thaçi for their leadership and determination.
Their personal engagement will continue to be essential in view of a swift implementation
of the plan’.39
An additional element that is ‘added’ in the EU’s discourse is its drawing attention
to and praising the leadership of the two parties. Kosovo’s Hashim Thaçi, former
35 CFSP, supra n. 5.
36 Š. Füle, Remarks Following the Meeting with Hashim Thaçi, Prime Minister of Kosovo (Pristina, 2013),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-704_en.htm.
37 European Commission, Additional Funding to Support the Normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia (2013),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1302_en.htm.
38 Economides & Ker-Lindsay, supra n. 19.
39 C. Ashton, Statement by HR/VP on the Implementation Plan for the April Agreement (Brussels, 2013),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137291.pdf.
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political leader of the guerrilla movement KLA, who fought back against
Milosevic’s troops in 1999; and Serbia’s Ivica Dacic, former politician in
Milosevic’s apparatus, constitute symbolic representations of the process. They
are the two exponents of the military attacks during the 1999 conflict but are
now under the EU’s facilitation signing agreements for the ‘normalization of
relations’.
‘Work on implementation will continue in the coming weeks with the same intensity so
that we maintain the good momentum achieved so far’.40
‘I met Prime Minister Dačić and Prime Minister Thaçi in Brussels today to continue
discussions on the implementation of the April Agreement’.41
This substitution of encountered problems in the implementation phase is
present in most of the communication on the dialogue. The discursive strategy
applied is the one of intensification and mitigation.42 On the one hand, the EU
is mitigating the obstacles to the implementation by discursive minimization,
pointing to the continuing negotiations on implementation, whilst on the other
hand, it robustly intensifies the positive elements regarding implementation, by
repetitive usage of words of praise such as ‘I am pleased’ and ‘I welcome’, to
the extent where an ‘almost progress’ is considered as ‘progress’, like in the
statement below:
‘We continued the work on the issues related to the implementation of the April
Agreement. In this context I am pleased that the two parties have almost concluded their
discussions on justice’.43
The latter insert is a very representative example of the point raised by Van
Leeuwen and Wodak that through recontextualization meanings are changed to
the point where ‘something stands for something else’.44 It illustrates not only that
the details of the obstacles in the implementation of agreements are generalized,
but also that they are positivized through selective intensification and mitigation,
that the whole meaning of this element is changed through discourse.
Neither the HR/VP, nor the Commission, nor the Council, ever mentioned
the implementation problems in their communication. Instead, the implementa-
tion process is always referred to with either a positive tone, in terms of ‘progress
40 C. Ashton, Statement by HR/VP on the Framework of the EU-Facilitated Dialogue (Brussels 2013), http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138377.pdf.
41 C. Ashton, Statement by HR/VP in the Framework of the EU-Facilitated Dialogue (Brussels, 2013), http://
www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/130908_02_en.pdf.
42 For discursive strategies, see M. Reisigl & R. Wodak, Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism
and Antisemitism (Routledge 2001).
43 C. Ashton, Statement by HR/VP in the Framework of the EU-Facilitated Dialogue (Brussels, 2014), http://
www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140331_03_en.pdf. Emphasis added.
44 Van Leeuwen & Wodak, supra n. 12.
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being achieved’, or a hortative one, in terms of reminding the parties of their
obligations to implement the reached agreements:
‘I am looking forward to continue my discussion with the leadership of Serbia and Kosovo
in order to move forward with the dialogue and the implementation of the agreements
reached so far’.45
‘At the meeting the two sides took stock of the progress in the implementation of the
agreements reached in the dialogue, in particular the implementation of the Justice
Agreement and the beginning of implementation of the Civil Protection arrangements’.46
‘The implementation of the Agreement of 19 April is vital to the normalisation of
Kosovo-Serbia relations and to the EU prospects of both’.47
‘To succeed, Kosovo needs a government, which is not only reform oriented, but which
will also support the dialogue with Serbia and the implementation of the agreements
reached to date not only for the sake of Kosovo and Serbia, but of the whole Western
Balkans region’.48
It is interesting to note that whereas the discourse that points to the dialogue
and the agreement mentions ‘Belgrade and Pristina’ as subjects, the EU uses
‘Kosovo and Serbia’ instead when talking about broader dimensions such as:
normalization of relations, settling of disputes and EU integration among
others. At first sight, this looks like a discursive inconsistency. However, it
is essential to note that ‘Kosovo and Serbia’ as agents for the most part appear
in the EU’s Annual Reports on Kosovo. The EU has published Progress
Reports for Kosovo since 2005, which is long before the country declared
its independence from Serbia, while it was still being administered by the UN.
In the EU’s Progress Reports, Kosovo appears as Kosovo* (This designation is
without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244
and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence) indicating
the EU’s neutral stance. Whereas in the previous example, we saw the EU
creating the simulation and the real for Belgrade and Pristina/Serbia and
Kosovo, in this case the EU is playing with its own alteration of meanings.
At times Kosovo is unequivocally downgraded to its (contested) capital (the
discourse on dialogue), and at times it appears as a (contested) state (the
discourse in Progress Reports).
An obvious and problematic substitution is the one of Kosovo Serbs, who are
largely missing from the EU’s discourse. As Bieber rightly notes, the implementa-
tion of essential parts of the Brussels Agreement as well as other ‘technical
45 CFSP, Catherine Ashton to Travel to Serbia and Kosovo (2013), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137792.pdf.
46 F. Mogherini, Statement in the Framework of the EU-Facilitated Dialogue (2015), http://www.eeas.
europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150421_09_en.htm.
47 European Commission, supra n. 37.
48 European Commission, Progress Report for Kosovo (2013).
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agreements’ relied not only on the authorities in Kosovo and Serbia but also on
Kosovo Serbs.49 Over the course of three years there is no single direct reference
to the Kosovo Serbs in the EU’s discourse on the dialogue. The absence of Kosovo
Serbs is highly problematic. Locally, amongst Kosovo Serbs and more broadly in
Kosovo, it is interpreted as a denial of ownership of the Serb community to the
‘normalisation’ process.50 Whereas most Kosovo Serbs, particularly those in the
north, look towards the Belgrade government and continue to reject Kosovo’s
independence as well as its institutions, they also increasingly see their role as the
bridge between the two governments.51 To date many Kosovo Serbs feel they
have not been represented in the dialogue by either the Kosovo government or by
that of Serbia.52 The importance of Kosovo Serbs in the process is quintessentially
linked with any project seeking ‘normalization of relations’ between the two
sides.53 Furthermore, it puts into question arguments made by mainstream scholar-
ship that the EU is carrying out the dialogue in a neo-functional spirit, ‘situated
between international facilitation and local ownership’.54
The continuing disputes and ‘abnormal’ conduct of Kosovo and Serbia,
such as statements by politicians that are in direct conflict with the aim of the
dialogue, are also deleted from the EU’s discourse. By and large, they are
substituted by politicians’ statements in support of the dialogue as the process.
This has allowed some politicians in Kosovo and Serbia to continue with their
discourse of hostility and hatred. In Serbia, officials continue to use terms such
as ‘extremists’, ‘fundamentalists’ and even ‘terrorists’ to describe their Kosovo
counterparts.55 Furthermore, Serbia strongly engaged in preventing Kosovo
from joining UNESCO, which in the eyes of Kosovo representatives was
against the spirit of the ‘Brussels Agreement’.56 When the dialogue hit a
stalemate, many politicians in Serbia also shifted to the discourse of partition,
an idea to divide Kosovo along ethnic lines that has been extensively dismissed
by all parties (including Serbia and Russia)57 throughout the Kosovo status
resolution process. This statement by Serbia’s Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić is an
example of this:
49 Bieber, supra n. 11.
50 Anonymous interviews with three Kosovo Serb Civil Society activists (Mitrovica 2016).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 V. Musliu & J. Orbie, MetaKosovo: Local and International Narratives, 18(1) British J. Pol. & Int’l Rel.
179–195 (2016).
54 Visoka & Doyle, supra n. 24.
55 M. Đurić, Edita Tahiri Rejected to Shake Hands with Me, Blic (13 July 2014), http://www.blic.rs/vesti/
politika/djuric-edita-tahiri-je-odbila-da-se-u-briselu-sa-mnom-i-rukuje/fpcrgzw.
56 Kosovo, Serbia, lobby hard before UNESCO vote, Balkan Insight (2 Nov. 2015), http://www.balkanin
sight.com/en/article/kosovo-serbia-lobby-high-ahead-of-unesco-final-vote-11-02-2015.
57 Economides & Ker-Lindsay, supra n. 19.
544 EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW
‘Government in Serbia is broken, it made a compromise. They don’t allow me to even
talk of partition any more, not even redrawing of borders, although I still believe that this
is the best and the only solution, that is the only acceptable solution for Serbs and
Albanians’.58
Kosovo officials, on the other hand, continued to claim that Serbia was recogniz-
ing Kosovo’s independence with each agreement that was reached.59 Even
Kosovo’s first Liaison Officer to Serbia, a position which was enabled by the
dialogue, stated that ‘normalization of relations’ would only happen when Serbia
recognizes Kosovo’s independence, a statement which led to his dismissal and
harsh reactions from the Serbian side.60 Other politicians, particularly those in
opposition in both countries, have further fostered the discourses of hatred and
hostility, thus putting into question whether socialization through the EU-facili-
tated dialogue had brought any changes to their attitudes towards each other. In
Serbia’s case, it is argued that this process brought superficial changes – a ‘pre-
accession Europeanization’.61 Whilst no such research has been conducted in
Kosovo, a glance at politicians’ discourse reveals a difference between their remarks
in Brussels, characterized by a tone of tolerance and cooperation, and those made
for the home audience, which are characterized by negativity and hostility.
4.2 ADDITIONS
In addition to deletion of certain elements and substitution of others, recontextua-
lization also involves adding elements to the represented practices. Van Leeuwen
and Wodak identify three main types of additions: legitimations, purposes and
reactions.62 In a more elaborated work, Van Leeuwen identifies additional types of
additions, namely repetitions, reactions, purposes, legitimations and evaluations.63
In this article, we have identified three main types of additions in the discourse of
the EU – purposes, legitimations and evaluations. Purposes are additions that are
not intrinsic part of a process that is being recontextualized, at least not in ways that
can be known explicitly.64 Legitimations are added to provide some answers to the
question why this particular process, or any segments of it, must be the way it is.65
58 I Dačić, Za Podjelu Kosova, Dijalog U Krizi [On Partition of Kosovo, Dialogue in Crisis], Aljazeera
Balkans (2014), http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/dacic-za-podjelu-kosova-dijalog-u-krizi.
59 E. Tahiri, With These Two Agreements Serbia Has Recognized Kosovo’s Independence (2013), http://www.
kryeministri-ks.net/?page=2,9,3741.
60 Kosovo Liaison to Serbia Resigns over Dispute with PM, AFP, EUBusiness (2013).
61 Economides & Ker-Lindsay, supra n. 19.
62 Van Leeuwen & Wodak, supra n. 12.
63 Van Leeuwen, supra n. 13.
64 Van Leeuwen & Wodak, supra n. 12.
65 Ibid.
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Similarly to purposes, they are added through discourse, but unlike purposes they
are never intrinsic. The last type of discursive additions are evaluations, defined as
judgments which are not legitimations in themselves and may appear without
being further legitimized, although ‘they are ultimately always connected with
legitimations’.66 It is important to point out that the nature of these additions is
often transcendental due to their overlapping features.
Although the aim of the dialogue is the ‘normalization of relations’ between
Kosovo and Serbia, it remains unclear as to what the ‘normal’ is in this context. If
concepts exist as a result of their ‘opposites’, it is imperative to ask whether the
relations between the Serbia and Kosovo thus far have been abnormal, and if so,
what this abnormality has consisted of. No such reference is ever made in any of
the documents or statements by the EU. Elements pertaining to ‘abnormalities’ in
relations between Balkan countries have largely been elaborated in Todorova’s
work.67 The persistence in EU discourse to regard Kosovo and Serbia (and more
generally the Balkans) as being entangled in deep seated animosities is also an
indication that every effort for the dialogue is seen as being the exact opposite of
the ascribed image that is given to both countries.68 This is perhaps best illustrated
by the following statement of former HR/VP Catherine Ashton, when she was
praising prime ministers of Kosovo and Serbia for courage and maturity, by saying
that:
‘These negotiations have been concluded. The text has been initialled by both Prime
Ministers. I want to congratulate them for their determination over these months and for
the courage that they have. It is very important that now what we are seeing is a step away
from the past and, for both of them, a step closer to Europe’.69
The intensified discourse of Serbia and Kosovo as ‘foes’ enhanced further the
importance of the dialogue and made the role of the EU as a mediator
quintessential. Based on Ashton’s declaration, the agreement is not (only)
important for what it entails with regard to the relations between the two
parties. Rather, by signing the agreement, the two parties were moving ‘closer
to Europe’ and stepping away from their allegedly ‘European path’, however
ambiguously that is in and of itself. This dimension adds yet another layer to
the ‘ambiguity’. Not only the terms and the specific points in the agreement are
ambiguous, but also the very ‘end result’ (i.e. closer to Europe) is highly
ambiguous.
66 Van Leeuwen, supra n. 13.
67 M. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford University Press 2009).
68 V. Musliu & J. Orbie, The International Missions in Kosovo: What is in a Name?, 19(3) Eur. For. Aff.
Rev. 411–428 (2014).
69 C. Ashton, Remarks by HR/VP on the EU-Facilitated Dialogue (2013), http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/136875.pdf.
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The trajectory of ‘normalization of relations’ is on the same line and/or is
essentially the same with the countries’ path to ‘Europe’. At times, it appears that
the dialogue is not (only) important for its actual relevance – that both countries
will agree on pending matters – but most importantly because the dialogue is first
and foremost a ‘European spirit’.70 Ultimately, very often the progress achieved
throughout the dialogue is used as a synonym for progress for the ‘European path’
of both Kosovo and Serbia.71 In this way, ‘Europe’, ‘the European path’, ‘the path
to Europe’ becomes a hegemonic trajectory.
In both the EU’s communication and that of the parties in the dialogue, it is
not clear what the understanding of the normal is, based on what based on what
should the process of setting a norm be assessed accordingly, for whom should it be
normal and by what means can this normality be reached? The only reference of
the ‘normality’ in this case is provided through the second, non-immediate but
rather gradual purpose of European integration, which is at the same time an added
legitimation, as it legitimizes not only the aim of the process – normalization of
relations between Kosovo and Serbia – but also the peculiarities of this normal-
ization and the conduct of the parties involved. At the same time, integration is
also added as an end-purpose of the process of dialogue.
In this way, leaving aside Kosovo’s independence and statehood – what could
be considered as the ‘abnormal’ element in relations between Kosovo and Serbia
and thus core to the normalization of these relations – the dialogue is justified and
legitimized in the spirit of integration. What could go against the claim of
integration not being intrinsic part of the dialogue is the fact that integration of
both countries is now closely linked to the dialogue by all EU institutions. The
very first announcement of the EU following the April 2013 Agreement reads:
‘At stake was whether to open negotiations on Serbia becoming a possible EU member
and a possible Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between Kosovo and the
EU. An agreement and normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina would
open a European integration future for both. Failure to agree would set this back and
freeze the process. After the EU brokered agreement on Friday, at the General Affairs
Council on Monday morning the European Commission formally recommended to EU
Member States that EU accession negotiations with Serbia and negotiations on an SAA
with Kosovo be opened’.72
Furthermore, progress to EU integration is conditioned by the Commission with
progress in dialogue. This is evident from the Progress Reports for both Kosovo
70 J. Barroso, Statement Following the Meeting with the Prime Minister of Serbia, Mr Ivica Dačić (2013), http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-577_en.htm>.
71 CFSP, Statement by the Spokesperson of EU HR/VP (2013), http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/
docs/2013/130925_02_en.pdf.
72 CFSP, supra n. 5.
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and Serbia and also from the overall communication, be that of institutions to the
public or inter-institutional ones.
‘With my interlocutors so far, we have reviewed Kosovo’s progress on EU reforms. Our
discussions focused on three key issues on the EU-Kosovo agenda for this year: 1. the need
to continue the normalisation process with Serbia; 2. the conduct of the general elections
(which as I was told are expected to be called soon); 3. the need to continue work on the
rule of law and other key areas of reform identified in our Feasibility Study and also in the
last Progress Report’.73
In spite of these references, we can still question whether the dialogue is about
European integration, especially as the representatives of Kosovo and Serbia have
never negotiated with each other about their respective European integration
during this dialogue. EU integration is rather the overarching ideal that serves as
an end-purpose thus motivating the parties to actively take part in the dialogue and
simply talk to each other, and, at the same time, a legitimation for the EU to keep
‘facilitating’ these talks in the current manner, despite the dubious effectiveness of
such talks in resolving the main issue of abnormal relations between Kosovo and
Serbia.
The last set of added elements to the EU’s discourse are evaluations,
which we can categorize in two groups. The first group consists of evalua-
tions made under the framework of European integration, that is evaluations
that are connected to the end-purpose of integration that is legitimized. These
additions vary from direct and narrow evaluation of the conduct of Kosovo
and Serbia in the process of dialogue, by linking it to their respective
integration processes, to general evaluations about the ‘European perspective’
for the countries:
‘I am confident that the agreement reached between the two sides will pave the way for
the Council to take decisions on the next steps on the European path of Serbia and
Kosovo. […] Both leaderships had to find compromises which by definition were never
going to be ideal for either side. This consensual approach will help both countries on their
paths towards the European Union’.74
‘The Council reiterated that continued visible and sustainable progress in the normal-
isation of relations, including the implementation of agreements reached so far, remains
essential so that Kosovo and Serbia can continue on their respective European paths, while
avoiding that either can block the other in these efforts and with the prospect of both
being able to fully exercise their rights and fulfil their responsibilities’.75
73 Š. Füle, Statement Following the Meeting with Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi (2014), http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-150_en.htm.
74 J. Barroso, On the Agreement in the EU-Facilitated Dialogue Between Serbia and Kosovo (2013), http://
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75 Council of EU,Main Results of the Council Meeting 25 June 2013 (2013) http://www.consilium.europa.
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It is clear that in the EU’s discourse, the dialogue and its achievements are
promoted and advertised, but also discursively foregrounded. In this way, being the
last conflict in the Western Balkans, merely after reaching an ambiguous agree-
ment, Kosovo and Serbia are promoted as best examples of regional co-operation,
as this speech of Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle to representatives of
Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates:
‘In the case of Serbia and Kosovo, Prime Ministers Dačić and Thaҫi found compromises,
that, while not ideal for either side, helped them find a way to normalise their relations and
move ahead on their European path’.76
The second set consists of evaluations of the process of the dialogue and the self-
evaluation of the role of the EU in this process. These evaluations are characterized
by usage of terms such as ‘outstanding’, ‘incredible’, ‘absolute’, ‘pleased’, ‘truly
delighted’, ‘impressive’, to evaluate the conduct and performance of the parties in
the dialogue, as well as ‘applaud’, ‘tireless’, and ‘personal investment and persever-
ance’ to commend the role of the HR/VP. Most importantly, they are character-
ized by evaluating the 2013 Agreement as ‘ground-breaking’ and ‘historic’. The
following inserts are just a few illustrations of such discourse:
‘The agreement today is historic and marks an important moment in the relationship
between Serbia and Kosovo as well as in their relations with the European Union’.77
‘I applaud the breakthrough by Serbia and Kosovo in their EU-facilitated dialogue. This is
a historic agreement, which must now be implemented quickly ‘This is an historic day for
Serbia-Kosovo relations, for the entire Western Balkans region and for the European
Union’.78
These added evaluations complete the process of recontextualization by high-
lighting purposes and intensifying legitimations, as well as by discursively legit-
imizing deletions and substitutions.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The on-going EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina brings to the
fore a number of problems with regard to the EU’s role in the process, the premise
of ‘normalization’ of relations between the two parties, the mutation of sovereignty
of both parties, and/or the implicit recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty. First and
foremost, the EU appears entangled in its role as a mere mediator or as a subject
76 Š. Füle, We Want to See Bosnia and Herzegovina Succeed, European Parliament (2013), http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-618_en.htm.
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that sets the agenda and the parameters of the dialogue. Second, focusing on the
symbolism of the two leaders negotiating, the ‘historicity’ of the agreement is the
mere act not the process or the outcome of the negotiations. Given the volatile
political context in which the dialogue is taking place (EU’s neutral stance towards
Kosovo), it becomes clear EU’s insistence of capitalizing on acts rather than
outcomes. Nonetheless, this symbolism of representation becomes the representation
itself. This pattern brings forward the question whether the dialogue itself along
with its historicity is such for the EU itself and not for Pristina and Belgrade as
subjects of this process. It is important to unpack how Serbia and Kosovo fit in EU
discourse of the historical agreement.
In addition to the ‘state level’, even more problematic in this respect, is the
absence of Kosovo Serbs in the discourse. If the mantra of the dialogue is ‘normal-
ization of relations’ between Serbia and Kosovo, while ‘silencing’ the Kosovo
Serbs, it is essential to ask ‘whom is this dialogue intended for’? What is the role of
the local constituents (i.e. the Albanians, the Serbs) in the project? How are their
inner disputes reflected informing the agenda of the dialogue? And while the
answer to these questions do not lend themselves to obvious answers, it is
important to keep them in mind while we contextualize the way the EU sets
out the importance of the dialogue.
Finally, what the EU’s discourse reveals with regard to the mediated dialogue
is indeed an overemphasis of the dialogue of former foes, facilitated and promoted
by the EU. Yet, there is not much emphasis on the actual role both countries
exercise, except for when it is mentioned in relation to their ‘courage’ and
‘political maturity’ of agreeing to sit with one another. The power dimension
reveals Serbia’s and Kosovo’s lack of agency and subjectivity in the negotiation
process. Both of them appear to be subordinate to the greater project of the EU for
‘historic achievements’ of the dialogue.
To conclude, the dialogue is not ambiguous merely in its content and in the
way the parties communicate its content and its results. There is a paradigmatic
ambiguity on the very question of what the dialogue means for the EU, for
Kosovo and Serbia, and altogether for the EU’s relations with both countries.
The EU makes rampant reference to the dialogue being ‘historic’, even though it is
not clear what exactly is historic about it and for whom this would be. The
dialogue and its value thereafter are downgraded to a mere symbolic representation
of ‘reconciliation’, to the fact that leaders of both countries have sat down together
and held discussions.
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